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A Report by NATO's
Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre



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17 February 2014



THE SKOLKAN SETTING

COMPREHENSIVENESS AND COMPLEXITY



THE CUSTOMER FOR THIS PROJECT IS NATO'S JOINT WARFARE CENTRE

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FOREWORD FROM THE COMMANDER

I am pleased to provide this report on the comprehensiveness and complexity of the SKOLKAN Setting to train NATO Forces for future threats.

This project offered a different set of challenges for the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre: not to find root causes underlying an identified issue or problem, but rather to determine the capabilities and limitations of an existing product.

As such, the findings of this report highlight where the SKOLKAN Setting supports the preparation and training of NATO forces to respond to the full array of potential threats the Alliance may be required to face. From these, I would like to highlight three overarching conclusions drawn from this analysis:

Firstly, SKOLKAN is—overall—a robust and comprehensive training vehicle that includes developed nations with significant conventional military capabilities, albeit with limitations. It has a strongly northern European flavour, meaning that it does not present great cultural, ethnic, or religious diversity or extreme forms of government such as theocratic states or autocratic dictatorships. In addition, SKOLKAN is very effective for training a wide range of land, maritime, and air operations, with the only significant limitation being blue water maritime operations owing to the setting of SKOLKAN 1 and SKOLKAN 2 in the Baltic Sea.

Secondly, conducting an Article 5 Collective Defence exercise required the training audiences to adopt a very different mindset from that which has been required of the Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations and exercises of the last two decades. However, it is clear that the Alliance will require both types of training scenarios to ensure that NATO forces are prepared to respond to the full range of potential future threats, especially if NATO real-world operations follow the trends of the last couple decades. This requirement has been recorded in the NATO Lessons Learned Portal.

Finally, the Direction and Guidance provided for the development of a Setting have dramatic and far reaching implications on the nature of the training and the types of threat and risk conditions which can be presented to a training audience. In SKOLKAN, this means that many of the limitations can be traced back to the Direction and Guidance.

A large, stylized handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'M. Mîndrescu', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Mircea MÎNDRESCU
Brigadier General, Romanian Army
Commander

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The recommendations included in this report require endorsement by the Strategic Commands and/or the report's principal customer. To know which recommendations have been endorsed, please contact SHAPE J7 PLL or HQ SACT CAPDEV CEI IDLL or check the NATO Lessons Learned Portal.

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INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

1. In 2008, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) directed that a new setting be developed for the 2011/2012 STEADFAST series exercises. This led to a SHAPE study, which formed the basis for SACEUR's 2009 Direction and Guidance to Allied Command Transformation and the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) for the new setting's development (Reference A).
2. STEADFAST JUNCTURE 12, in November 2012, was the first exercise based on the new SKOLKAN setting. Following this exercise, JWC conducted an internal review of the SKOLKAN Setting and was able to identify several areas for improvement.
3. The JWC believed it would also be beneficial to have an independent review of the SKOLKAN Setting, in order to assess how it could be used to further enhance the preparation of NATO forces with respect to current and future threats. Based on a resulting JWC request for analysis support, the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) was tasked by Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) to conduct this review (Reference B).

ANALYSIS REQUIREMENT AND OBJECTIVES

Analysis Requirement: Conduct an analysis of the SKOLKAN Setting in order to determine whether it is comprehensive and complex enough to prepare NATO forces for future threats.

AO 1 Describe the Continuum of Conflict in terms of the operational contexts in which NATO might find itself acting; against which settings and scenarios can be benchmarked.

Sub-AO 1.1 Identify issues, factors, capabilities, activities, etc. that comprise the Continuum of Conflict, paragraph 218 of AJP-01D (Reference C).

Sub-AO 1.2 Prepare an architecture against which the full potential of the SKOLKAN Setting, and future Settings and Scenarios, can be benchmarked.

AO 2 Describe the applicability of the SKOLKAN Setting within the contexts of the Continuum of Conflict, including "Future Threats" and NATO Responses. (Determine the comprehensiveness and adaptability of the SKOLKAN Setting).

Sub-AO 2.1 Identify factors (direction, guidance, constraints, limitations etc.) that influenced the Setting's development/focus.

Sub-AO 2.2 Review the materials that have been developed to support the Setting.

Sub-AO 2.3 Determine how well the SKOLKAN Setting can be used to: a) incorporate varying degrees of "states of the situation" and "Future Threats" and; b) permit/support taking a range of actions to affect the situation.

Sub-AO 2.4 Clarify how and where the SKOLKAN Setting addresses the original guidance from SHAPE.

PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

4. The purpose of this report is to present the major findings of the project team's review of the SKOLKAN setting material to the JWC. This report should serve to document the JALLC's independent view of how well the setting meets SACEUR's Direction and Guidance

and identify areas where the current iterations of the setting may not be comprehensive or complete enough to prepare NATO Forces for future threats.

5. In addition to this report, the JALLC supplied JWC with working-level documents comprising 15 summary sheets and the master spreadsheets for the Architecture, which contain all the details of how the JALLC conducted the analysis, and which are designed to be used by the setting designers to further refine future SKOLKAN materials. These were not included in this report, in no small part because they represent information that the JWC may not wish a Training Audience (TA) to have access to.

METHODOLOGY

6. In order to provide an assessment of the SKOLKAN setting materials, the JALLC decided to create an exhaustive Architecture containing a list of indicators—potential contexts, actors and their actions—designed to encompass any possible eventuality that could be presented to a TA. The sources and methodology for creating this Architecture were described in the JALLC's June 2013 Incremental Report 1 (Reference D). The Architecture was further refined based on feedback from the customer and a number of Subject Matter Experts (SME) to whom Reference D was circulated.

7. The project team then turned to the published SKOLKAN material and assessed each of the fictional countries separately based on their Country Books. For each country, the indicators were marked as present, partially present, or absent. This was recorded numerically, allowing the scores to be aggregated for each indicator over of the all eight SKOLKAN countries.

8. On the basis of the aggregated scores, each indicator was colour coded red, yellow, or green. Within each sub-group, the proportion of red, yellow, or green indicators was translated into a colour code for the sub-group as a whole and again for the groups of sub-groups. This coding was also repeated for two subsets of the SKOLKAN countries—the six in-area and the two out-of-area—in order to consider where the indicators are located.

9. The colour coding allowed the project team to subjectively focus on factors that were either not present in the current material or limited in some way. These groups, sub-groups, and indicators could then be investigated in greater detail: referring back to the Setting materials and engaging with SMEs from the JWC, and Centres of Excellence.

10. In order to present the team's findings in usable format, the issues were aggregated in a number of summary sheets representing a category of information. Though these categories were not mutually exclusive, they were intended to be collectively exhaustive. The most important category was an assessment of how well the setting met the Direction and Guidance that led to its creation. Following this were a number of summary sheets based logically on the construction of the Architecture, described in Reference D. Finally, we created a series of summary sheets based on what a TA is being trained towards—including the NATO Core Tasks and Mission, Operational Contexts and Initiatives.

11. The most significant findings were developed in more detail and have been written up into this report. This report makes use of the overall SKOLKAN setting material, the details of the SKOLKAN 1 iteration and those details of SKOLKAN 2 that have been released to us, meaning that some of the points made in this report may be addressed in the material prepared for iterations SKOLKAN 2 and 3.

12. This chapter looks at the ability of the SKOLKAN setting to present comprehensiveness and complexity across the range of future threats to the Alliance and support the spectrum of responses these may require from NATO forces.

13. After a brief background to the SKOLKAN setting, the first section of this chapter deals with how SKOLKAN has met the Direction and Guidance put forward for its creation. The next two sections deal respectively with whether or not SKOLKAN is comprehensive and complex enough to train NATO forces. For these purposes, *Comprehensiveness* is whether the Setting can be used to train the TA to NATO's needs and *Complexity* is what complicating factors can be credibly introduced to the Setting to challenge the TA.

Caveats

14. When reading this report, it is important to highlight two interrelated factors that are fundamental to any training setting: realism and credibility. SKOLKAN is—by its mandate—semi-fictitious and as such, almost anything can be introduced via the *Road to War and to Crisis* or in the Main Events/Main Incidents List. However, if the TA considers the scenario material to be unrealistic then they will not respect the exercise and will learn less.

15. A Setting, while foundational, is neither fixed nor static: it will continue to develop and evolve the more it is used in different exercises, with different training and exercise objectives. Each such use of the SKOLKAN setting will result in an enrichment of the data that underlies different geographical areas and actors. This report is intended to highlight areas where something is prevented from being realistically introduced, rather than something that has just not been written in as yet.

DIRECTION AND GUIDANCE

16. Based on SACEUR's original Direction and Guidance, the project team identified 69 specific criteria. Even though this represented an ambitious requirement, the resulting SKOLKAN setting satisfies, to one degree or another, nearly all of the criteria stipulated. Our analysis assessed that nearly 70% were fully met; roughly 16% were met with caveats; and approximately 13% were at least partially met. Only one criterion, Strategic Distance, could not be met, which, given the choice of geographic setting, should surprise no one.

17. However, several aspects of the Direction and Guidance significantly affected, and in some cases constrained, the overall "look and feel" of SKOLKAN.

Range of Tasks, Missions, Threats and Responses

18. The Direction and Guidance included being able to support the full set of tasks for which NATO forces may be dispatched: not only Article 5/Collective Defence, but also the tasks, missions, and operations implied in Crisis Management and Cooperative Security.

19. The Direction and Guidance also stipulated that SKOLKAN must be able to support training across the full spectrum of current and future operations encompassing the full range of NATO employment options. This means that the setting must be structured such that it could credibly present the entire range of threats that would elicit responses along the full spectrum of current and future operations and employment options. Basically, the Direction and Guidance dictated that the setting be able to train NATO forces for every contingency and every possible threat.

Fictitious and Real-World Data

20. The Article 5 premise of the setting meant that some exercise play would occur in actual NATO member states, unlike in prior settings such as CERASIA, where all countries were fictitious. The Direction and Guidance stipulated that NATO nations could have their military capabilities altered to fit the setting and that, where possible, real world geography would be used but new national boundaries would be drawn to create the fictitious countries.

21. Although the Direction and Guidance provides latitude to include fictitious political, economic, social, and infrastructural information for the non-NATO countries, it specified that the Setting needed to retain certain degrees of regional credibility. This portion of the Direction and Guidance is therefore the most significant in determining what could, or could not, be included in the setting.

Choice of Location

22. One major stipulation was that SKOLKAN must allow NATO forces to exercise response to Collective Defence situations, including the invasion of a NATO nation. The SKOLKAN setting met this by placing its fictitious countries adjacent to NATO countries—the close proximity of the "fictitious" in-area states to NATO nations allows realistic introduction of threats to the territorial integrity of Alliance members.

23. The term Strategic Distance carries the image of acting half a world away in a landlocked country with tenuous lines of communication. It seems hard to reconcile this image with threats to territory of NATO Nations and SKOLKAN has not done so. The choice of the SKOLKAN region as the location for the Setting indicates Collective Defence was a higher priority than Strategic Distance for purposes of training NATO forces.

COMPREHENSIVENESS

24. In broad terms, SKOLKAN can train for most identified potential threats and address a very wide range of training and exercise objectives. This comes in part from the large amount of detailed information that has been included in the country books, the Geospatial data, and other materials.

25. While our overall assessment is positive, there are some areas that warrant highlighting. Many of the areas where comprehensiveness is lacking are not so much shortcomings of how the setting was developed but result directly from stipulations in the Direction and Guidance or the choice of location.

Threats

26. A total of 105 potential threats, adversaries, and risk conditions were identified in AJP-1(D)'s 21st Century Threats (Reference C) and in the Multiple Futures Project (Reference E), for use as the baseline for this assessment. Of the 105, 100 were deemed to be clearly present, or at least feasible to introduce into the SKOLKAN setting. Three areas in particular raised credibility issues, at least in terms of the current setting's materials and location:

- a. Nuclear Attack: Although technically possible, a conventional nuclear attack in the region seems unrealistic as none of the in-area SKOLKAN countries possess nuclear weapons. The one fictitious country that does have them, Dushman, is out-of-area and signatory to a wide range of non-proliferation, test ban, and non-first-use conventions and treaties. In line with guidance SKOLKAN does provide a good framework for nuclear escalation vignettes in support of Political-level exercises.
- b. High Seas Piracy: While some incidents of piracy could occur, large scale, organized piracy is unrealistic. The Nations bordering on the Baltic Sea in SKOLKAN all have strong maritime capabilities and vested interests in preserving security on the seas—even if Arnland's status as a failed state in SKOLKAN 2 might offer haven to such activities. There is potential to make use of the island nation of Lindsey as a base for piracy.

c. Natural Disasters: The Scandinavian region is not geologically "active"; that is, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions are either rare or do not happen. As the Direction and Guidance mandated use of real-world Geographical data, the mainland SKOLKAN region is also not geologically active. This region is, however, at risk from ash clouds resulting from volcanic eruptions in Lindsey or Iceland (as with the Eyjafjoell eruption in 2010) and extreme winter weather or Atlantic storms.

Tasks, Missions, Operations and Employment Options

27. The presence of strong conventional military forces in the region allows SKOLKAN to train forces for both low and high intensity conflicts. The setting can also support scenarios exercising different scales of operation, from NATO Response Force (NRF) initial entry and Small Joint Operations to Major Joint Operations. Some may say that writing a credible scenario for a Major Joint Operation is harder due to the imbalance of forces between antagonist nations and the Alliance, but this has been achieved with SKOLKAN 1.

28. The project team identified 25 sub-tasks based on the three NATO Core tasks described in MC 0400/3 (Reference F), all of which are at least feasible under SKOLKAN. The sub-tasks that are less feasible are those that involve a "*distant operational area*"—as discussed in the Choice of Location subsection above, the distances from NATO nations to the SKOLKAN region are deliberately small.

29. Similarly, all of the 51 baseline NRF / Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operation (NA5CRO) tasks identified in Allied Command Operations (ACO) Directive 80-96 (Reference 0) and AJP-3.4(A) (Reference G) are at least feasible in SKOLKAN, with only two problem areas. The first is *Conflict Prevention*, which does not lend itself well to operational level training, though it would be appropriate for a Political level exercise. The second is to *Deny access to/use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by insurgent/terrorist organizations*, which would require the introduction of more in-theatre terrorism with realistic means of access to sources for the WMDs—as is planned for SKOLKAN 2 with an escalated terrorist threat, the nuclear plants, reactors and transit systems between countries.

30. It also seems to be feasible to use any of the 41 employment option contexts in SKOLKAN, with two marginal cases. Both SKOLKAN 1 and 2 take place in the southern portions of the SKOLKAN region, where there is well-developed infrastructure in place and the climate is mild compared to places further north, meaning that they do not represent deployment into austere environments. In addition, the SKOLKAN region only contains two time zones (three, if accounting for the westernmost European NATO Command Structure); meaning that the maximum time difference that TAs will have to contend with is three hours.

Training NATO Forces

31. Overall, SKOLKAN showed itself to be quite comprehensive, being able to realistically present the single service HQs (Air, Land, Maritime) with a very wide range of tactical level operations. The only significant limitation was on blue water maritime operations owing to the setting of SKOLKAN 1 and SKOLKAN 2 in the Baltic Sea. It is unclear how this can be rectified and still remain compliant with the Direction and Guidance to use real geographical data.

32. The fact that the SKOLKAN 1 host nation is a NATO member state introduced very different legal and Rules of Engagement issues than have been present in out of area failed state, operations such as CERASIA. These include dilemmas for the operational commander with respect to political permission for his actions, potential restrictions on the use of PsyOps within a NATO nation, as well as limitations on the use of certain intelligence collection assets, and entirely different challenges to a Comprehensive Approach where the key partner entities are the government bodies of a NATO nation.

COMPLEXITY

33. The complexity that is built into SKOLKAN allows it to support a very wide range of training and exercise objectives, from the Political to the Tactical level. SKOLKAN has already demonstrated it can serve as a platform for joint exercises and there are no apparent barriers to it being able to be used for single service training. Exercise TRIDENT JUNCTURE 14 will provide valuable insight on this latter question.

34. While our overall analysis of SKOLKAN is very positive, there are four limitations, all having to do with diversity in the setting's background material, that require highlighting:

a. Cultural/Religious Diversity: The Multiple Futures Project and 21st Century Threats both identify religious and ethnic rivalries and tensions as potential threats for the Alliance; however the religious and ethnic groups in the current form of the Setting are more homogeneous than diverse. Although the lack of diversity is not a constraint imposed by the Direction & Guidance, it is integral to the mutual support of the SKOLKAN nations and their motivation for conflict with NATO. It could be feasible to introduce more extreme beliefs, biases, and ideologies into future SKOLKAN iterations, but this would represent a major revision—effort that might be better applied to a developing different Setting.

b. Diversity of Military Equipment: In SKOLKAN 1 the equipment and weapons employed by adversarial countries are primarily of Soviet/Russian design—giving this particular variant a very strong Cold War feel, even if the scenario does nothing else to encourage this. As a result, SKOLKAN 1 does not encourage a TA to think about many of the current and potential future forces the Alliance may be required to face. Future iterations will make use of the greater array of military equipment and capabilities present in other SKOLKAN nations, however the limitation remains in SKOLKAN 1.

c. Diversity in Types of Governance: The governmental structures that SKOLKAN presents tend to be fairly similar in nature, although there is a range of economic foundations, and varying degrees of fairness in elections. While there are countries with autocratic flavours (Bothnia, Torrike), extremes such as totalitarian dictatorships or religiously controlled theocracies are not present and all of the countries respect civilian control of the military—there is little room to realistically include warlords, tribes or super-empowered individuals. This is not a constraint imposed by the Direction & Guidance, but does result from the emphasis on Collective Defence. It should be feasible to push the existing government types to more extremes as part of future development.

d. Diversity in Climate and Terrain: As a result of the use of real geographic data in the development of the fictional countries, they have very similar terrain features and fairly similar climates, both to their real world equivalent and to each other. There is some variation between the coastal areas, low altitude regions and some higher altitude mountainous regions, but the general similarities in terrain and climate reduce the variety of employment conditions that SKOLKAN can realistically present to TAs. These are constraints imposed by the choice of the location and the Direction and Guidance to use real geographic data, though some degree of variation could be introduced by using the entirely fictitious isle of Lindsey in a future variant.

35. There are two areas where the SKOLKAN setting is particularly effective and deserving of mention:

a. Comprehensive Approach: The SKOLKAN 1 operation takes place within Alliance territories, in a functional NATO member nation. The Alliance must therefore be aware of—and work with—a wide variety of host nation and neighbouring state agencies and their representatives. This means that NATO forces are just one actor among many—NATO forces must attend meetings run by the host nation and comply with their rules and regulations because rule of law is still in place. Many of the interactions are through official liaisons, rather than by direct contact. This makes SKOLKAN an excellent setting to train NATO commands in a Comprehensive Approach, though not necessarily in the

same ways or with the same set of International Organizations that would be part of a Comprehensive Approach in a third world crisis spot.

b. UN Veto: The out-of-area fictitious country of Dushman has strong alliances with many of the adversarial, in-area countries, as well as holding a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. As such it can veto any UN Resolution concerning the SKOLKAN region, raising the possibility that calls for intervention might not be UN sanctioned, or sanctioned with specific limitations—posing a challenge for non-Article 5 operations in the region.

CONCLUSIONS

36. The Direction and Guidance was extremely ambitious—essentially calling for three Settings to be developed under the guise of creating one. While the Direction and Guidance called for the Setting to present the full range of future threats and to train the full spectrum of potential NATO responses, no single variant was expected to meet all of these conditions. When examined as a whole, therefore, SKOLKAN is a robust and comprehensive training vehicle and the combination of all SKOLKAN settings will be able to train NATO forces to respond to a very broad range of potential future threats.

37. Even though SKOLKAN *overall* is robust, training traditionally only uses single variants which means individual exercises will not be as robust—the breadth of the potential training being narrower. The common material shared through the overall setting does however create the opportunity to blend elements of the setting variants by developing a combined scenario in which NATO is simultaneously faced with a crisis response operation and an attack on a member nation.

38. The thinking required of TAs for SKOLKAN 1 is different to that which NATO forces have become accustomed to in operations and exercise over the last two decades—it requires a different mindset than the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) or CERASIA. The challenge will be to prepare NATO forces to operate successfully in both types of engagement environments.

39. One limitation of the Setting is that even though SKOLKAN 2 is a NA5CRO, it does not include all of the conditions present in ISAF or CERASIA: operations area-wide diversity of ethnic and religious groups and ideologies; significant cultural differences that are present between African or Middle-Eastern populations and the NATO forces; or Strategic Distance. As such, SKOLKAN does not fully replicate the conditions that have been present in many of the recent real-world operations, unlike CERASIA which was specifically designed along these lines. While this was the result of a conscious decision to prioritize Collective Defence, it nonetheless needs to be highlighted.

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Annex A

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ACO	Allied Command Operations
AJP	Allied Joint Publication
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JALLC	Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre
JWC	Joint Warfare Centre
NA5CRO	Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operation
NRF	NATO Response Force
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACT	Supreme Allied Commander Transformation
SME	Subject Matter Expert
TA	Training Audience
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

Annex B

LESSONS LEARNED PORTAL ENTRIES

INTRODUCTION

The scope of this project was to assist the JWC setting designers in their work by giving an independent assessment of whether or not the SKOLKAN material was comprehensive and complex enough to do what it was designed to do. As such, both the Architecture and this report were created in order to inform a technical audience rather than make recommendations. As the analysis unfolded, however, the team became aware of a number of issues that are relevant to a wider NATO audience. These issues were entered into the tracking area of the NATO Lessons Learned Portal as follows.

NLLP Item #2009

Article 5 and non-Article 5 Exercises

Observation

The training audience participating in Steadfast Jazz 2013 stressed that SKOLKAN 1 required an entirely different mind-set than that required of NATO exercises and real-world operations over the last couple decades.

Discussion

There are significant, qualitative differences between the roles NATO will play in an Article 5 versus an out-of-area Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (NA5CRO). As such, SKOLKAN 1 provides a good platform for training the Article 5 role, but not the NA5CRO.

Article 5: SKOLKAN 1 is an Article 5 setting in which one of the fictional SKOLKAN countries (Bothnia) initially invades one of the Estonia islands in the Baltic Sea, and eventually establishes a foothold on the Estonian mainland. Thus the SKOLKAN 1 engagements take place on NATO soil and in a developed, industrialized state—with intact infrastructures, the rule of law in place and fully functional political, economic, social, and informational systems.

Because the operation takes place in a fully functional state, NATO's role is one of providing support to the Host Nation (HN) rather than being in charge. NATO participates in HN-led sessions and the HN is still quite capable of handling issues such as decontamination and hazardous material spills—often having more capabilities in theatre than NATO. The HN maintains a tight control over NATO interactions with their government agencies and representatives (as well as the few IO/NGOs that are in country). Internal displacement of population will likely result in them driving across the country to stay with friends or relatives.

NA5CRO: SKOLKAN 2 is a non-Article 5 crisis response setting, in which one of the fictional countries (Arnland) becomes a failed state and a second, Torrike, takes advantage of the breakdown to attempt to absorb Arnland. Thus NATO's involvement in SKOLKAN 2 takes place in failing or failed states in which there is little or no functional HN governance to coordinate with and NATO is more to lead than to support.

Because of its failing nature, the HN does not have many basic capabilities such as medical facilities, let alone more sophisticated proficiencies such as conducting decontamination—NATO forces must bring with them any of these capabilities that they may require. NATO's engagement with the in-theatre individuals and agencies is directly established rather than through governmental liaisons, with the majority being with IOs/NGOs rather than

governmental agencies or representatives. Internal displacement of population will likely result in major refugee issues requiring foreign aid and IO/NGO involvement.

Overall: SKOLKAN 1 prepares NATO forces for Article 5, Collective Defense operations as it was designed to do, however there are aspects of NATO's full range of operations and potential threats that this scenario does not train. Similarly, neither CERASIA nor SKOLKAN 2 can prepare NATO forces for Article 5, collective defence scenarios—a perceived training gap that led to the creation of the SKOLKAN setting.

Conclusion

A single type of exercise (Article 5 or NA5CRO) does not provide the full range of training that NATO forces will require to be prepared to respond to all future threats the Alliance may be required to face. The full benefit of the overall SKOLKAN setting will only be realized if HQs staffs can go through both types of exercise.

Recommendation

SACEUR, supported by HQ SACT, should ensure that NATO exercises rotate between Article 5 and NA5CROs scenarios.

COM JFC BS and COM JFC NP should increase the amount of staff participating off-year in each other's exercises.

NLLP Item #2010

Impact of Direction and Guidance on SKOLKAN Setting Development

Observation

JWC was directed to develop an exercise setting that would train NATO forces across the full spectrum of current and future operations and the full range of potential future threats to the Alliance. Aspects of the direction and guidance imposed constraints on the development that, when combined, inadvertently made full compliance nearly impossible.

Discussion

The direction and guidance provided to JWC for the development of the SKOLKAN settings was extremely broad and yet simultaneously detailed and specific. There were elements of the direction and guidance, however, that ended up being contradictory—where achieving one made achievement of another nearly impossible. For example:

- The requirement for an exercise in which preservation of the territorial integrity of the Alliance (Article 5) could be trained logically required that the setting be located in close proximity to NATO nations. However, doing this made achievement of the guidance to support operations at “strategic distance” impossible.
- One aspect of the direction and guidance stipulated that real world geography would be used where possible since it “provides the conditions and precise mapping detail necessary to train for real operational requirements”. As a result, the climates and geographical features of the mainland fictitious SKOLKAN countries and surrounding bodies of water were limited to those of the real world countries they replace.
- In order to maintain a semblance of realism with respect to the region in which the Setting was based, the SKOLKAN populations generally mirror the cultural, ethnic and religious characteristics of the existing populations. Although this homogeneity was not specifically mandated by the direction and guidance, straying too far from the expectations the Training Audience has of a known region would begin to stretch the credibility of the scenario.

Guidance on specific geographic location and the use of real world geographic data constrains the setting and scenario development in terms of the threats, risks and responses

that are realistically presented to a training audience at the political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure levels.

Conclusion

The direction and guidance and choice of location for the setting had significant impact on its “look and feel” as well as the types of training conditions and range of potential threats and risk conditions it could realistically present to training audiences.

Many of the ramifications of the direction and guidance, along with the choice of location, had unintended secondary and tertiary consequences that were not obvious at the time these requirements were established.

Recommendation

SACT should task the JALLC to create a point paper on the development of political/strategic direction and guidance for setting development, in order to advise that decisions which result in trade-offs, and compromises are made deliberately—with a full understanding of their consequences.

Annex C

SUMMARY SHEETS

40. In addition to this report, the JALLC supplied JWC with working-level documents comprising 15 summary sheets and the master spreadsheets for the Architecture, which contain all the details of how the JALLC conducted the analysis, and which are designed to be used by the setting designers to further refine future SKOLKAN materials. These were not included in this report, in no small part because they represent information that the JWC may not wish a Training Audience (TA) to have access to.

41. In order to present the team's findings in usable format, the issues were aggregated in a number of summary sheets representing a category of information. Though these categories were not mutually exclusive, they were intended to be collectively exhaustive.

a. The most important category was an assessment of how well the setting met the Direction and Guidance that led to its creation.

b. Following this were a number of summary sheets based on the construction of the Architecture, described in JALLC's June 2013 Incremental Report 1:

- Political
- Military
- Economic
- Social
- Information
- Infrastructure
- Environment
- Threats
- Geospatial

c. Finally, we created a series of summary sheets based on what a TA is being trained towards:

- NATO Core Tasks and Missions
- NATO NRF and NA5CRO
- Operations and Deployment Contexts
- JHQ Functional Area Training
- NATO Initiatives